Log In, Log Out, Left Out: Gender and the Gaps in India's Gig Economy Law

Author: Yash Chandan (B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) Student) | 18-Nov-2026

Introduction

In a late-capitalist India of the 2020s, gig and platform workers have become a common sight across its cities and towns. Labelled as “partners” and “independent contractors”, not “employees,” bound by a “user agreement” and not an “employment agreement” by their hiring platforms, some of them went on a nationwide strike on New Year’s Eve last December. Their catalogue of demands ranged from better wages and insurance coverage to greater social security. Within weeks, the Union Labour Ministry warned major players in the quick commerce space like Blinkit, BigBasket, Zepto, and Swiggy Instamart against “algorithmic disciplining”, telling them to drop their “10-minute delivery” model in favour of a more realistic and relaxed one. The new arrangement reportedly carries neither incentive for on-time deliveries nor penalty for late deliveries.

But, noticeably, the deliveries are still to be made within “minutes,” if not precisely within ten minutes. Hence, the removal of a single legible cause of gig workers’ anxiety by selective intervention is no panacea. Martha Chen, a leading scholar on the informal economy, identifies the gig economy as an emerging form of informal wage employment characterised by outsourcing, deregulation, and digital platforms. She emphasises that gig work is not a new category outside the traditional informal economy but rather a creator of the so-called “platform economy,” which exacerbates pre-existing informality and inequality. The companies in this space practise what has come to be known as “platform capitalism,” which extracts value from its delivery partners while simultaneously offloading associated risks by misclassifying them as “non-employees.” They also indulge in arm-twisting practices such as algorithmic disciplining, which includes incentivising & disincentivising, arbitrary de-platforming, assessing delivery-based performance metrics, and constant ratings pressure, amongst others. It is essentially a disciplinary and penalty mechanism that the author Alex Rosenblat refers to as the “algorithmic boss.” Meanwhile, the hiring companies often rebrand gig work as self-chosen, flexible, and entrepreneurial work that offers handsome pay on an “opt-in-opt-out, log-in-log-out” model.

The Scale and Composition of India's Gig Workforce

A policy brief published by the NITI Aayog in June 2022 estimates India’s gig workforce to be around 7.7 million (77 lakh) in 2020-21, which rose to 12 million (1.2 crore) in 2025-26, as per the latest Economic Survey report. This workforce is expected to swell to around 23.5 million (2 crore 35 lakh) by 2029-2030, equivalent to roughly 6.7% of the national non-agricultural workforce. But a skill-based breakdown of this millions-strong workforce paints a bleak picture: about 78% of gig workers are engaged in low-to-medium skill work, while only 22% form part of the lucrative high-skilled category. Over 85% of them average 8 to 9 hours a day, and 40% earn less than Rs. 15,000 a month. The majority possess thin-file credit histories that lead to zero-to-minimal financial inclusion with the state and national financial architectures. 

The Code on Social Security, 2020: Provisions for Gig and Platform Workers

The Code on Social Security (CSS), 2020, whose rules were finally published by the Ministry of Labour & Employment in May 2026, and which is the only code among four centralised labour codes that mentions gig and platform workers, has mandated or suggested the following in relation to them: First, that aggregators (ride-hailing, e-commerce, quick commerce, and food delivery companies) must contribute 1-2% of their annual turnover (capped at 5% of total workers’ payouts) to a welfare fund serving the social security needs of their partners. Second, every gig and platform worker should register themselves with the central e-Shram Portal to obtain a unique Universal Account Number (UAN). Third, that a National Social Security Board, meant to advise, supervise, and recommend, be constituted for the welfare inclusion of gig and platform workers. And fourth, that a dedicated, non-lapsable, centralised Social Security Fund also be created to address the coverage gap among gig and platform workers, such as for accidents, health, maternity, old age, and disability.

A Half-Baked Framework: Enforceability and Coverage Gaps 

CSS, 2020, aimed to statutorily define gig and platform workers for the first time and provide social security cover that didn’t include them under previous legislation meant for organised workers, such as the Payment of Wages Act, Minimum Wages Act, the EPF, and the ESI Act. For all its noble intentions, the CSS, 2020, remains a half-baked piece of legislation marred by minimal stakeholder consultation and questionable enforceability standards. The code provides for no formal, mandatory, and statutorily enforceable benefits for gig and platform workers. It only provides meagre tangible benefits to gig workers in particular, who are defined as a separate class of workers because they lack an online intermediary platform that hires them for a “work arrangement.” But both gig and platform workers share a common interest in that they are defined as working “outside of a traditional employer-employee relationship.” The workers are also asked to register with the e-Shram portal, which serves merely as a national database of unorganised, unregistered, and undocumented workers, the majority of whom are seasonal and migratory, without providing any welfare entitlements. The code also doesn’t take into account the realities of multi-platforming (or multi-homing) when it mandates that a worker needs 90 days with a single aggregator or 120 days across multiple platforms to qualify for benefits. It provides for no cumulative benefits, divisible security, cross-platform aggregation, or portability of benefits, and also doesn’t fundamentally change the nature of the association of these gig and platform workers with their hirers. The code also heavily leans on the modal verb “may” instead of “shall” in relation to legislative provisions for platform workers, which makes it more of a recommendatory than a mandatory piece of legislation.

Comparative Regulatory Models: EU, Spain, UK, and Singapore

For legislative inspiration, India can look up to other countries for their regulatory frameworks, including the European Union’s 2024 Platform Work Directive, which introduced a rebuttable legal presumption of employment favouring the workers (e.g., criteria like setting pay ceilings, supervising performance electronically, and restricting working hours; the Directive specifies five; meeting two triggers the presumption). It also defines strict control criteria and enforces greater algorithmic transparency to protect genuine self-employment. Similar provisions were introduced in Spain’s “Rider’s Law” of 2021, the first algorithmic transparency mandate within Europe. The U.K.’s “dependent contractors” classification creates a separate class of workers with tailored social security provisions, and Singapore’s Platform Workers Act  2024 (in force since 2025) introduced an incremental social security cover architecture over a period of 5 years. A phased, elemental, and need-based introduction and implementation of some of these could alleviate a majority of workers’ concerns across the country.

Gendering the Gig Economy: Exclusion, Exploitation, and the Pay Gap

Situating women and examining their working conditions within the gig and platform workers’ economy throws another set of challenges before policymakers and lawmakers. The gig workers’ economy reproduces gender segregation rather than disrupting it. The gender gap in ride-hailing and delivery services remains stark, with only 1% of women represented. They are more concentrated in traditionally “feminine” roles such as home services for beauty & wellness, cooking & cleaning, and the care economy, with about 35 to 45% of women represented in specialised professional services companies such as Urban Company and Pronto. So women workers’ natural association with domestic settings puts them at a greater risk of exploitation (physical, mental, psychological, economic, etc.); surveillance (individual tracking, constant monitoring by companies, etc.); and digital harassment (e.g., from rogue customers), with no definitive institutional or administrative recourse such as POSH-mandated committees, compounded by the fact that 80% of women in India report harassment at work (Martha Farrell Foundation 2018) and are anyway at a greater risk of facing physical violence outside of their home environment. The World Economic Forum (WEF) also highlights a stark 30% gender pay gap in the gig and platform workers’ economy, which is wider than in traditional employment roles. Women’s inclusion in this economy is exacerbated by unpaid caregiving burdens and structural informality surrounding their role in the wider economy and society. They continue to face acute algorithmic bias (minimal ride/services acceptability, de-platformisation); logistical issues (lack of self-owned and compatible two-wheelers, limited access to technology and personal mobile phones); and safety risks (sharing personal numbers with platforms and customers, street harassment, late-night deliveries in remote settings), amongst a host of other factors.

Conclusion

Recognising the peculiar needs of gig and platform workers, and that of women in particular, remains the most crucial pillar of devising innovative policy solutions for this crucial and rapidly growing workforce in India. A gig or platform worker, for example, operates under hybrid work modalities that combine the characteristics of both an employee and an independent contractor. Deadlines, penalties, regular availability, fixed durations, etc., fall under the former, while their relative autonomy (in contrast to formal employment) and juggling work across competing platforms fall under the latter. A gendered analysis of the gig and platform economy highlights the marginalisation of women and gender minorities in terms of logistical compatibility, resource accessibility, infrastructural availability, ownership of delivery/service tools, associated risks, and socio-cultural norms surrounding women in employment in India. Therefore, an all-round critical diagnosis of the “gig question” includes central, nationwide legislation on gig and platform workers that mandates enforceable social security and insurance; provides incentives, bonuses, and cancellation compensation; a day-and-night human-led grievance redressal mechanism; rest-and-wellness hubs for workers; women-led crisis management intervention teams to ensure women workers’ safety and security; sanctioned unionisation of gig and platform workers for increased collective bargaining and class solidarity; and adequate monitoring & implementation mechanisms, among others. The law must act before the Gig Bike vrooms past.